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Abstract—Morality is a significant element in literary works throughout history. In Victorian England, it 
gained unprecedented concern because of the loss of religious belief and material progress. Matthew Arnold, 
the most influential critic of his time, attaches great significance to morality in literature. The major reason for 
Victorian’s morality concern is presented and the religious background of that time is introduced. Matthew 
Arnold’s belief in poetry’s religious function is stated and analyzed. 
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The significance of morality in literary works has been in dispute for centuries. From Plato on, moral concern, 
through ups and downs, however, is more or less indispensable in literary production and criticism. Victorian England is 
much noted for its strong attachment to moral concern. Under the influence of the Victorian environment, many literary 
men, in their search for a solution to the inner conflict have constituted from the beginning a strong ethical and moral 
element in their literary works. 
I.  NECESSITY OF MORALITY IN A TRANSITIONAL AGE 
 The concern of morality is an indispensable element in literature. The unity of the Greek ethos guarantees the unity 
of Greek drama, from which Aristotle extracts the assertion of “Catharsis.” At that time, men were still comparatively 
simple in their thinking in their assumption that, for their experience, the most powerful of instruments was poetry. 
Morality, or more specifically, morality in religion, had provided a stay for human soul in the Middle Ages. Then moral 
prepossession which had dominated antique centuries passed on to the Renaissance. In that spirit and faith Sidney wrote 
about function of literature; and that spirit and faith is to be found in Spencer and Milton. And the tradition passes to the 
great romantics: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and many other obvious names we may leave aside. We even find Byron, a 
seeming dandy, who appears less a palpable member among other moralists, claims that the highest of all Poetry is the 
ethical and the highest of all objects should be moral truth; and Shelley, an atheist himself, shared with Byron the same 
judgment. 
Writers on controversial topics are only too prone to see the years of their own as epoch-making, especially when 
religious issue, an essential one both in literature and reality, is in question, and Victorian literary men belong to this 
category in a particular way. Victorians and literary in Victorian period are much noted for the concern of morality. 
According to M. H. Abrams, the term “‘Victorian,’ and still more Victorianism, is frequently used in a derogatory way,  
to connote narrow-mindedness, sexual priggishness, the determination to maintain feminine ‘innocence’ (that is, sexual 
ignorance), narrow-mindedness, and an emphasis on social respectability” (1999, p.329). That is certainly a 
representative opinion prevailing in modern age. However, a moment’s thought should propel us to realize how partial 
and unsatisfactory such generalizations are likely to be. Though it has been in constant debate whether or not literature 
and morality are two distinct spheres with no inherent connection, this “problem” is “less a philosophical problem than 
a problem arising from the ingrained attitudes in most of our minds” (Buckley, 1959, p.14). 
To understand their moral concern, we have to have a close look at their religious condition. By the time of Protestant 
Movement, life was still conceived primarily in theological terms, and to its problems, religion alone held the answer or 
was to find the answer there. Fundamental unity of Christian thought remained unimpaired until late part of the 
eighteenth century, because as the products of the Middle Ages, Protestantism, were still at one with Catholicism, and 
shared most of the presuppositions with the opponents. Catholicism then was forced to find compromise unavoidable in 
the nineteenth century because rationalism of the eighteenth century already made divine revelation difficult. Together 
with many subdivisions within English Anglican, there are good grounds for accepting contemporary views on the 
decades in the early nineteenth century in England as a time of crisis in religion. 
Victorian England was co-perverted by both optimistic and pessimistic air resulting from material prosperity and 
spiritual decaying. In 1870, Disraeli noted the current “disturbance of mind” and “ascendant materialism,” which were 
caused, “Firstly, by the powerful assault on the divinity of Semitic literature by the Germans; and secondly, by recent 
discoveries of science, which are hastily supposed to be inconsistent with our long-received convictions as to the 
relations between the Creator and the created” (Robbins, 1959, p.6). The desire to seize a new faith under emotional 
stress, or to cling to the old Christianity and accept it for all its superstition for the sake of social order and personal 
                                                        
 The article is funded by “The Cultivation of Outstanding Talents Project of Beijing Municipal City”(The project “Study of Matthew Arnold’s Idea of 
Morality in a Transitional Age”, 2012D005007000008) and “The Importation and Development of High-Caliber Talents Project of Beijing Municipal 
Institutions”(The project “ The Study of Morality in Victorian England”, CIT&TCD201404119). 
ISSN 1799-2591
Theory and Practice in Language Studies, Vol. 5, No. 9, pp. 1815-1821, September 2015
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17507/tpls.0509.07
© 2015 ACADEMY PUBLICATION
need, had found both in its tensions the readiness to abandon private judgment for embracing some external authority. 
But which authority to accept is the question. When whether to choose The Old or the New religion was still unsettled, 
minor branches of the new already in dispute. What is worse, in that high period, the commercial prosperity and general 
expansion around the mid age left the educated reader freer to observe and take sides in the religious ritual controversy 
as in Oxford Movement and the debate on the relations between the Church and State. Cheerful optimism or serene 
tolerance was hardly the only distinguishing sentiment over Biblical criticism, Ritual practices, and the claims of 
physical science. Even the Oxford Movement was, on the whole, doctrinal or ritual without much metaphysical 
appealing. For all its width and tense in the scope, the Oxford Movement left the controversy unsolved. The eventual 
result is, as Matthew Arnold wrote to his French correspondent, M. Fonanès in 1881: 
Religious disputes… still attract great attention, and create passions and parties; but certainly they have not the 
significance which they once had. The moral is that whoever treats religion, religious discussions, questions of churches 
and sects, as absorbing, is not in vital sympathy with the movement of men’s minds at present… The great 
centre-current of our time is a lay current. (Russell, 1895, p.1:5) 
For all its force, the effect did not last long in a time when an external authority still imperative. 
Oxford Movement died out, but the religious crisis remained unsettled. When the faith wavered, when God seemed 
remote and the dignity of man merely hypothetical, the artist lost his capacity to feel at rest and his assurance that the 
higher self actually exists. Arnold laments that his “Scholar-Gipsy” at Oxford could to less extent “animate” or 
“ennoble” the despairing soul. Yet the melancholy of the poem remained comprehensible to many “light half-believers 
of their causal creeds,” who were unable to make for righteousness consciously. As the Sea of Faith ebbed, the intellect 
lay naked to all the winds of doubt with nowhere to stand firm. In an age overpowered the will to believe; and the mind 
was left, without ethical sanction, to its own divided aims. Without a hard heart, man may easily go astray to inner 
bewilderment, just as Empedocles did. It was under such mind state that Arnold wrote his famous lines: “Wandering 
between two worlds, one dead, / The other powerless to be born…” (“Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse” ll.85-86). 
The dead world being the world of orthodox beliefs and certainties, the one not yet born may come from the world of 
scientific truths and demythologized religion. Arnold’s reinterpretation of the Bible and Christianity in an effort to 
establish their unique claim to permanence as moral and spiritual guides is one of the endeavors to restore their sense of 
wholeness of his contemporaries. The disintegration of the unity of man, nature, and God which Empedocles 
experienced in his time, and which Arnold experiences in modern world, is not an isolated event. The moment of 
Empedocles’ death is “a true turning point or pivot of history,” because it is the instant, as J. Hillis Miller sees it, “when 
God withdraws from the world,” and only at such a time does man experience himself as “complete emptiness” (1963, 
p.261). All Arnold’s frustrated attempts to escape back to the epoch when man could participate in the divine life have 
led him inexorably to the discovery of the truth about man’s present condition: “vacuity and distance” are what man, in 
these bad times, really is. And this “vacuity and distance”, “the void which in our breasts we bear,” can in no way be 
escaped (Ibid). 
In 1861 Jowett prophesied that “in a few years there will be no religion among young men, unless religions is shown 
to be consistent with criticism” (qtd. in Robbins, 1959, p.8). The important implication is that intellectual men could not 
find satisfaction within the Church to meet both their emotional and spiritual needs and their critical intelligences. It 
was of prime urgency to reconstruct a spiritual holder, because when faith could no longer sustain its former spiritual 
condolence and sustain. It was an age as in which the opinion that religious belief was necessary for moral and social 
purposes was universal, and yet real belief was feeble and precarious. 
II.  THE FUNCTION OF LITERATURE IN A TRANSITIONAL EPOCH 
Under the influence of the Victorian environment, and more particularly of his father Thomas Arnold, Matthew 
Arnold’s search for a solution to his inner conflict had constituted from the beginning a strong ethical element. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, literature itself began unmistakably to play the role, or at least was intended to play 
the role, that religion once had. Victorian men of letters resorted even more to morality than their predecessors, which 
manifests itself in their highlighting exploration of morality in the literary works. For one thing, a set of rigid religious 
ritual and “miracles,” already under severe suspicion in itself, could not match the scientific exploration of a nation 
prospering at an unprecedented speed. Meanwhile, the prevailing anxiety that religion was fast losing its power would 
kindle man’s aspire for a moral sustainment to defend from the fear of unbelief. Such anxious uncertainty was to be 
relieved by the accentuated moral attachment to literature, which was beginning to be endowed with religious bearing 
outdoing its task, as Sir Sidney preaches, to teach and to delight. 
In the nineteen century, there emerged “the belief that the aesthetic consciousness was capable of organizing and 
transfiguring the whole of human experience” (Madden, 1967, p.v). Despite a marked shift from idealist to empirical 
attitudes in philosophy generally, the tendency to endow poetry and art with an unprecedentedly grandeur power gained 
in clarity and precision as the nineteenth century progressed. “Though few could explain the exact process by which art 
was to accomplish its religious mission, none questioned its ultimate relevance to the ethical needs of an aspiring 
people” (J. H. Buckley, 1981, p.144). At the time of Hegel and Goethe, art has already begun to take on a function 
analogous to religion, and even to some extent replacing it (Honan, 1981, p.299). Schiller’s belief in art, under whose 
spell Arnold was also influenced, helps to explain such phenomenon by describing the aesthetic impulse as going 
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beyond the individual and as capable of binding the whole of society together in a new and higher form of culture. In 
England, Thomas Carlyle claims, “Literature is but a branch of Religion, and always participates in its character: 
however, in our time, it is the only branch that still shows any greenness; and, as some think, must one day become the 
main stem” (Abram, Norton Anthology, 2006, p.926). In Arnold and the Romantics (1977), W. A. Jamison explored 
Victorian definition and their moral concern of poetry. He cites from Carlyle, Mill, Ruskin, Leigh Hunt to illustrate their 
preponderance on content to metrical composition, and poetic “healing” function felt by Mill, Newman, Keble, who 
regard poetry as “medicine,”“solace for the mind” to free them from disappointments and sufferings of actual life. 
(p.11-13). So Matthew Arnold, when making his claims for the religious function of literature, was only stating a 
phenomenon that had become, in many instances, a fait accompli. As a practicing poet, Arnold, like Goethe and Schiller 
before him, found the idea of harmonizing and ennobling human experience through poetry had an enormous appeal. 
Religion for them is often a goal arrived at by the way of literature; and in the last two centuries, “in agnostic or convert 
alike, literature and religion unmistakably overlap” (Raleigh, 1957, p.263-64). It was in this way and for this purpose 
that such writers as Carlyle, Mill, Arnold and GeorgeEliot became literary critics, and all the more, moralists. 
In 1881 publication of Arnold’s “The Study of Poetry” made a great stir which threw him into incessant depreciation: 
The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry, where it is worthy of its high destinies, our race, as time goes on, 
will find an ever surer and surer stay. There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not 
shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has materialized 
itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it. But for poetry 
the idea is everything; the rest is a world of illusion, of divine illusion. Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea is 
the fact. The strongest part of our religion today is its unconscious poetry. (Super, 1973, p.9: 161) 
It is from this declaration that T. S. Eliot fires the severe attack on of Arnold’s attempt “to affirm that the emotions of 
Christianity can and must be preserved without the belief,” and he strongly scolds that “Arnold dismisses altogether the 
intellectual element in religion, and leaves only art and morals; … and truly moral art is all that Arnold leaves us in the 
place of religious faith” (1928, p.66). “From this proposition,” Eliot continues to draw his conclusion, “two different 
types of man can extract two different types of conclusion: i) that Religion is Morals, ii) that Religion is Art” (1932, 
p.434). 
There is a tradition of interpretation associated with T. S. Eliot, I.A. Richards, and Lionel Trilling on charging Arnold 
with religious aestheticism, with having reduced religion to poetry, to a moral subjectivism. It is presented in Trilling’s 
biography of Arnold, for instance, the charge of religious dilettantism that Arnold is but “a connoisseur of Christianity” 
(1939, p.363).In the analysis of the origins of Arnold’s religious belief, DeLaura suggests, “the conflation of all these 
disparate men, Edmund Copleston, John and Thomas Keble, Edward Hawkins, and Newman,” as well as the grounds 
for his admiration, suggest “the complexity, and perhaps the confusion” of Matthew Arnold’s religious position (1969, 
p.10). Such confusion can be explained in the context of larger social background. W. O. Raymond, in a survey of the 
Higher Criticism in England during the nineteenth century, concludes that the typical attitude of the English mind to 
questions of philosophy and religion, similar to the views of Nature, is marked by “individualism, subjectivity, lack of 
systematic development, absence of radicalism” (qtd. in Robbins, 1959, p.11). Under such circumstances, something 
universal, objective and systematic is imperative. 
Arnold’s distinction as a propagandist for ethical criticism, Leavis also claims, cannot be questioned, yet it must be 
also apparent, he continues to argue, the propaganda could hardly have had its virtue if the pamphleteer had not had 
notable qualifications in criticism. The value of this essay, Leavis defends that, does not “depend on our accepting 
without reservation the particular terms in which Arnold stresses the importance of poetry in these introductory 
sentences, and he is not disposed of as a literary critic by pointing out he was not theologian or philosopher; nor is it 
probed that he was incapable of consistency and vigour of thought.” (1968, p.261)The value lies in instead, if we 
deplore Arnold’s way with religion, Leavis continues, that “as the other traditions relax and social forms disintegrate, it 
becomes correspondingly more important to preserve the literary tradition” (ibid). As was the case with so many of his 
views, the seed of the idea was Victorian anxiety and had its nurture from the Victorian moral climate. When things are 
as already they were in Arnold’s time, it is necessary, as what Arnold has undertaken for “Culture,” to do the work by a 
theologian as such if he could do it better. One could not construct an Arnoldian “theology” on such judgment as 
Professor Lowry’s reasonable but guarded statement that Arnold “probably knew more philosophy than he is generally 
given credit for” (Lowry ed., 1932, p.5). Perhaps there is no happier term to apply to him than ethical idealist. With a 
clearer view and a more balanced estimate than prevailed in the first half of this century, Arnold’s view on religion, if 
not fully right, is stimulating. As Barzun’s cool concession puts it, “compared with some of the religious enthusiasts of 
today…Matthew Arnold would be accounted a precisian” (qtd. in Robbins viii). It is more to the point to examine what 
he had to say, and why he felt he had to say it, in the light of his reading, his life and times, and his considerable 
influence. When this is done, the conviction emerges that in a broadly human context, morality is one of the eternal 
human problems, and his approach is again synthesis. Arnold was, in Mrs. Humphry Ward’s words, “A Modernist 
before the time” (Machhann, 1988, p.31). He was ahead of his time in foreshadowing in philosophical and theological 
thinking what are characteristic of our own day. What he offers is a Christianity reduced to its essential values by the 
eliminating of an obsolete incredible supernaturalism. He appeals to basic fact of Christian experience, but his approach 
is that of literary critic. 
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The key to this liberal tradition is the experiential and the moral foundations of religious belief. Arnold explicitly 
asserts that “The paramount virtue of religion is that it has lighted up morality” (Super, 1962, 3:134).God must be 
envisioned as the ground of moral values and, therefore, conceived essentially as a moral influence, rather than in 
abstract metaphysical sense. God is known neither by intellectual demonstration nor by mystical vision but rather by the 
exercise of conscience and the moral will. Arnold’s religious position must not be viewed simply as that of a maverick 
or a dilettante but rather that it must be seen as standing squarely in a tradition of liberal-modernist theology, when to be 
interpreted in a more broad way. Arnold claims in some way a moral purpose for literature. Why he should have to say 
such things is a question rarely asked within a discipline so concerned to examine its own history. Eliot has always been 
at pains to reject the legacy of nineteenth-century critical thought, and at the same time to establish an adequate notion 
of the reality of poetry. The interest arises out of his sense of the interior order both of a poem and of the poet. In both, 
his thought centers on the idea of impersonality. For Arnold, however, it is an internal and external need combined. 
Whatever moral reality poetry possesses, then, is intimately connected with the question of order. Arnold did see poetry 
and the poet as interrelated, but poetry means far more than a mere utterance of the author’s mind, rather, he is against 
using poetry as an expression. For him, poetry is making something, i.e., the utility of poetry. There are traces of 
Utilitarianism’s influences, but Arnold is cautious of vulgarizing poetry in practical application.  
III.  ARNOLD’S MORAL CONCERN IN POETRY 
All through his life, Arnold has been searching for the Idea behind the concrete form in poetry. What he concerns in 
religion is also the organizing Idea, which for him has been waning and becoming materialized. “But moral rules, 
apprehended as ideas first, and then rigorously followed as laws, are, and must be, for the sage only. The mass of 
mankind have neither force of intellect enough to apprehend them clearly as ideas, nor force of character enough to 
follow them strictly as laws” (Super, 1962, 3: 134). Arnold tries to redefine religion so to reestablish the connection 
between God and man by endow morality the religious function. 
He does not want, however, a narrowly didactic poetry and considers preaching a debasement of the poet’s function, 
instead, he revolts against it. Arnold believes passionately in the beneficent influence of “culture,” urgently needful in 
an age whose civilization had become increasingly “mechanical and external” and whose religious tradition in decline. 
His writings in later years are mainly centering on religious concern, and some criticism advanced against him that 
Arnold had forsaken Hellenism for Hebraism, had reversed the stand taken in Culture and Anarchy. Such criticism 
missed the obvious fact that religion was an integral part of culture, as Arnold saw it. His definitions of culture, 
embracing reason and the will of God as the marks of that perfection which is man’s goal, reveal clearly that the 
Hellenistic emphasis aimed at the English Philistine was not intended to be made at the expense of religion. Arnold’s 
religious writings were a deepening and modifying of his plea for culture, not a retreat from Greece to Israel. The 
touchstone method used in his literary criticism comes into play, to distinguish between mere morality and that which is 
“morality touched with emotion,” or religion. 
Hebraism and Christianity, then, have that heightened insight and feeling about morality which constitutes religion. 
The Hebraic virtue of self-conquest and the stoic virtue of resignation, coupled with the intellectual virtue of 
disinterestedness, prepared for that simple, intuitive, spontaneous apprehension of the whole of experience which 
characterized great poetry. Arnold developed his aesthetic position and solved the religious problem within an 
epistemological framework which placed the imaginative reason at the summit, connecting morality (religion’s ethical 
element) with the Hellenic ideal of total perfection, dogma (the intellectual element) with the free play of dialectical 
reason, and ritual or liturgy with that visitation of creative energy which organized man’s noblest moral and intellectual 
experiences so as to make them beautiful. Here again it is his reconciliation habit at work. 
Life itself, as Coleridge taught, is a tension between opposite forces and the life of faith subsists in a tension between 
two poles of experience: between the head, which finds no sufficient evidence, and the heart, which bids us trust the 
larger hope. “The moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be reunited, and in the highest conception of 
them are inseparable” (Super, 1977, n11: 179). Arnold’s fear is that once the intellect has gained control, it not only 
destroys the wholeness of the world but dissolved the union between man, Nature and God. Arnold noted “I cannot 
conceal from myself the objection which really wounds & perplexes me from the religious side is that the service of 
reason is freezing to feeling, chilling to the religious mood. & feeling & the religious mood are eternally the deepest 
being of man, the ground of all joy& greatness for him. (Ullmann, 1989, p.160) 
For him the essentials are dignity of thought and sentiment and distinction of manner and utterance. In modern man, 
a martyr to thought, insight and mystery—necessities for a poet, which lies beyond reason, has been blotted out by the 
blighting light of intellect. Mind and spirit no longer form a unity－for this there must be faith in something beyond 
what can be known by the rational mind. The age was uncongenial, the state of knowledge uncertain, and the struggle 
too lonely, not because the poetic gift and the ambitions it inspired were unworthy, but the disillusionments and anxiety 
caused by the division between the mind and heart. For Arnold morality is feeling and emotion attachment as against 
the intellect and reason which will frozen emotion, for which he is torturing in their split. 
In the early fifties he turned to morality and “character” in order to escape the dialogue of the mind, with its 
disillusionments and ennui. Yet, as “Empedocles on Etna” makes clear, the moral life, so far as it was characterized by 
mere endurance and stoic resistance, was to Arnold a second best.  For Empedocles “the wisdom of his race” has 
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ceased to have any cogency. Consequently, he rests on the light of the independent intelligence. He counsels Pausanias 
against a superstitious credulity in the gods and urges on him the practical necessity of intellectual faculty. “Mind is the 
spell which governs earth and heaven” (l.27).Yet he knows—and this is the essential source of his grief—that the mind 
can attain to no complete and certain knowledge: 
Hither and thither spins 
The wind-borne, mirroring soul, 
A thousand glimpses wins, 
And never sees a whole; 
Looks once, and drives elsewhere, and leaves its last employ. 
The Gods laugh in their sleeve 
To watch man doubt and fear, 
Who knows not what to believe 
Since he sees nothing clear, 
And dares stamp nothing false where he finds nothing sure. (ll. 82-91) 
The primary thing, to Arnold, is the feeling of peace and spiritual well-being at the triumph of the higher rational self 
over the lower self, not the literal interpretation emerging in a stock theological image like that of the clay and the potter. 
It is, in this sense, life is the visible victory of the higher self. Despair meant the refusal to realize the true self by 
devotion to the Eternal. And “the most dangerous form of despair,” said Kierkegaard, was “man’s unawareness of his 
spiritual essence, his blind absorption in material values. The troubled soul beset with a liberating ‘despair’, a genuine 
weariness of the ego, and a passionate desire to find some new center of life which might renovate the springs and 
purify the aims of the social and exhausted nature”; And “the dark night of the soul,” or the “spiritual dryness of 
medieval mysticism,” could be experienced only by one who “recognized the loss which his inability to ‘die’ unto the 
old self, by one who could cry aloud for succor “in a dry and thirsty land where no water is” (qtd. in J. H. Buckley, 1981, 
p.92). 
Our “materializing” theology must realize that on intellectual grounds it cannot cope with modern science. The one 
thing needful is to “restore the intuition.”Starting with Arnold’s assumption that a broad culture and literary insight－
what remained powerful part in religion at the time was poetry－are indispensable for restoring the intuition, for basing 
the permanent truth of the Bible on psychological experience rather than on dogmatic authority or systematic theorizing, 
we may notice here the critical “tact” at work. “Moral culture [is] so intimately allied to, nay incorporated with aesthetic 
culture,… that to their mutual perfection the one cannot be conceived without the other” (qtd. in Robbins, 1959, p.55). 
Arnold suggests that society is “controlled by the actual instincts and forces,” so that “it must seek to penetrate and 
then check with other “instincts and forces. It is on this basis he calls for a transformation of the “dominant idea of 
religion through the re-energizing stimuli of culture and poetry (Madden, 1967, p.169). Religion, however, is not 
abandoned. The whole book of Culture and Anarchy indeed is a collection of articles nearly indecipherable without 
understanding of the religious expressions at the time. Arnold desires to shift the trend of doing into inner self thinking 
as his terminology of the categories of “Hebraism” and “Hellenism”. “The Hebraic virtue of self-conquest and the stoic 
virtue of resignation, coupled with the intellectual virtue of disinterestedness, prepared for that simple, intuitive, 
spontaneous apprehension of the whole of experience which characterized great poetry” (Madden, 1967, p.169). Here 
again his sense of unity is at work, endeavoring to embrace two spheres of human mind activities in a harmonious entity 
of the self and the state. 
Arnold’s poetical work may be seen to have as one of its significant nexus the apprehensions that are achieved by his 
persistent attempts to discover what poetry in his age could be. His method is indirect. Two dominant topics of Arnold’s 
investigation are the question of the artist’s attitude toward external experience, a problem that is usually approached 
through the opposition of those antitheses. Underlying these speculations—and inseparable from them—is an attempt to 
define the attitudes the wise poet should take toward his own age and toward the past and the future alike. For Arnold 
aesthetic and ethical ideals are ultimately the same, so that the way of the wise poet, which involves a paradoxical 
detachment with participation, the achieving of a passionate sincerity, is also the way by which the thoughtful man may 
be reconciled to life.“In best art,” Arnold thus explicitly claims, “poetry and morality are one”( Super, 1964, 4: 161, 
1965, 5:100). 
Arnold’s claims for poetry, as defined by Leavis, are “religious claims; and they are intimately connected with his 
expectations of poetry as a moral force” (1968, p.263). “The best of Arnold’s criticism is an illustration of his ethical 
views, and contributes to his discrimination of the values and relations of the components of the good life” (ibid). His 
moral obsession with poetry is in accordance with his interpretation of poetry as criticism of life, composed with ideas. 
“The noble and profound application of ideas to life is the most essential part of poetic greatness”(Super, 1973, 9: 337). 
The evaluation of poetry as “criticism of life” is inseparable from its evaluation as poetry; that the moral judgment that 
concerns us as critics must be at the same time a delicately relevant response of sensibility. 
Whenever there is some question, he tends to resort to the effects of poetry and combining the religious and aesthetic 
power into one. This is consistent, in a way, since he is almost a sort of “pragmatist.” One may measure the seriousness 
with which Arnold embraces his classical standards by noting that in judging his own poetry he elevates ‘Sohrab and 
Rustum” above ‘The Scholar-Gipsy.” This ranking, with which very few readers would agree, gives evidence of how far 
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spiritual anxiety could impel Arnold into aesthetic moralist. He would “judge the truth of poetry, just as he would judge 
the truth of Christianity, by its inward effects, its power to stabilize man and fit him for his moral action” (Vincent 
Buckley, 1959, p.53). Such a view is obviously unsatisfactory beyond a certain point, and it is too subjective. But he is 
an odd critic: “a great critic whose chief terms run over into one another, and persuade by their confusion” (ibid). We 
cannot agree with him in his solution, but we cannot help feeling the same with him in questioning. 
In all its operations this principle of redress and restraint, of balance and flexibility, is “in a tradition of humanistic 
writing which looks back to Erasmus and forward to Edmund Wilson” (Robbins, 1959, p.163). His own critical 
principles reflect “a philosophy that reveals, not logic and system, but rather a set of attitudes that are eclectic in 
allegiance and tolerant in application” (ibid 162). It is the reciprocal relation of the intellect and emotion that has made 
up what there is of our civilization, the two polarities of “the imaginative reason,” which Arnold strives as the climax of 
his endeavour, the completion of his critical doctrine. The synthesis has been achieved, the dialectic successfully 
resolved. The phrase is persuasive and challenging. Yet it is a phrase, as many of his other catchwords, which defies 
precise definition. So Arnold became the most influential critic of the Victorian era because he assimilated the views of 
his age, corrected their eccentricities and excesses, and states them in a more coherent and consistent form. Arnold 
agreed that poetry should teach moral truth; but he recognized the complexity of the assignment more clearly than most 
of his contemporaries, and insisted that in fulfilling it poetry must retain its peculiar identity. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Arnold’s theory of poetry, at first designed to combat romantic melancholy, has its intrinsic limitations which can be 
accounts for by the situation it was devised to correct; while its strength lies in its reassertion of the humanistic value of 
poetry in an age of aesthetic confusion- diversity in interest can be seen, in a sense, as a state of confusion. Arnold’s 
effort, however, was bound to fail; for he tried to “impose upon the post from outside a form of discipline and an 
attitude of mind without sufficient consideration for the idiosyncrasy of the individual poetic temperament and for the 
necessary genuineness of the poetic impulse” (Jamison, 1977, p.23).He intended to construct a set of principles from by 
building a best self from inside, but the order, once established, has to be qualified by an outside measurement. His 
effort turns to fail in the end. But Arnold tried to invert the generally accepted relationship between poetry and the 
morality by asking the poet to supply the deficiencies of his age. His theory is important however not only as a 
corrective to the spiritual dilemma of his age, but as a reminder that we have not yet solved the problem with which he 
had struggled. The absence of an abiding faith as a center for moral action has continued to haunt thinking men in 
modern society.  He faced the central issues of his day and of ours. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Abrams, M. H. (1999). A Glossary of Literary Terms. 7th ed. Philadelphia: Harcourt Brace College Publishers. 
[2] Abrams, M. H. ed. (2006). Norton Anthology of English Literature. 8thed. New York: W. W. Norton. 
[3] Arnold, Matthew. (1965-90). Prose Works of Matthew Arnold. Super, R. H. Ed. (11 vols). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press. 
[4] Buckley, J. H. (1981). The Victorian Temper: A Study in Literary Culture. London: Cambridge UP. 
[5] Buckley, V. (1959.). Poetry and Morality: Studies on the Criticism of Matthew Arnold, T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis. London: 
Chatto and Windus Ltd.. 
[6] DeLaura, David J. (1969). Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England: Newman, Arnold and Pater. Austin: Texas Press. 
[7] Eliot, T. S. (1928).The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.. 
[8] Eliot, T. S (1932). Selected Essays, London: Farber Faber Limited. 
[9] Honan, P. (1981). Matthew Arnold: A Life. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
[10] Jamison, W. A. (1977). Arnold and the Romantics. Copenhagen: Rosenkilde and Bagger. 
[11] Leavis, F. R. (1968). Scrutiny. London: Cambridge University Press. 
[12] Lowry, H. F. ed. (1932). The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough. London and New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
[13] Machann, C. and Forrest D. B. eds..(1988). Matthew Arnold in His Time and Ours: Centenary Essays. Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia. 
[14] Madden, William A.(1967). Matthew Arnold: A Study of the Aesthetic Temperament in Victorian England. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
[15] Miller, J. H.. (1963). Disappearance of God: Five Nineteenth Century Writers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
[16] Raleigh, J. H. (1957). Matthew Arnold and American Culture. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
[17] Robbins, W. (1959). The Ethical Idealism of Matthew Arnold. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
[18] Russell, George W. E. ,ed.. (1895). Letters of Matthew Arnold: 1848-1888. London: Macmillan and Co.. 
[19] Trilling, L. (1939). Matthew Arnold. London: Oxford University Press. 
[20] Trilling, L. ed.. (1980). The Portable Matthew Arnold. New York: Penguin Books. 
[21] Ullmann, S. O. A., ed. (1989). The Yale Manuscript. Ann Arbor: Univerity of Michigan Press. 
 
 
 
1820 THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES
© 2015 ACADEMY PUBLICATION
Bin Xiao was born in Changsha, China in 1973. She received his PH.D. degree in English from Hunan Normal University, China 
in 2010. 
She is currently an associate professor in the School Foreign Studies, Beijing Information Science & Information University, 
China. Her research interests include English literature and teaching methodology. 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES 1821
© 2015 ACADEMY PUBLICATION
